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Comments
THE CONDITIONAL SALE IN LOUISIANA
The so-called "conditional sale" of the common law is a contract by which the possession of personal property is transferred
under provisions reserving title in the transferor' until payment
of a specified amount of money (usually designated the "purchase price").2 The attempts to introduce this -security device
1. The passing of title determines whether a sale is absolute or conditional. Bailey v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 239 U.S. 268, 36 S.Ct. 50, 60 L.Ed. 275
(1916); Northern Finance Corp. v. Meinhardt, 209 Iowa 895, 226 N.W. 168

(1929).
2. Bice v. Harold L. Arnold, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 629, 243 Pac. 468 (1925);
Young v. Phillips, 203 Mich. 566, 169 N.W. 822 (1918). Cf. City of Boscobel v.
Muscoda Mfg. Co., 175 Wis. 62, 183 N.W. 963 (1921).
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into Louisiana have raised a number of serious problems, which
it is the purpose of this Comment to consider.
In the Roman law, a sale was not in itself translative of
ownership; there had to be a separate transaction to constitute
a legal transfer8 In France, however, transmission of ownership
is an essential element of a sale, and consequently, contrary to
the Roman principles, the sale of a thing belonging to another
can not be effected.4 But the transmission of ownership is not
an essential effect, and the parties may freely stipulate against
the ordinary result, and provide that ownership will not be
transferred until certain conditions have been complied with.5
Thus, without doing violence to the underlying theory of their
law, the French recognize a counterpart of the conditional sale.0
3. Girard, Manuel Elmentaire de Droit Romain (5 ed. 1911) 535; Buckland, A Manuel of Roman Private Law (1928) 283, § 109; Radin, A Handbook
of Roman Law (1927) 218-219.
4. 1 Guillouard, Trait~s de la Vente & de L'Echange (2 ed. 1890) 13-14, non
5-6; 24 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (1877) 6-7, no 2; 10 Planiol
et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1932) 2-3, no 2.
5. 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 4, 13-14, no 6: "La vente est par sa
nature, disons-nous, translative de propritd, et le vendeur obligd de droit
4 effecturer cette translation;mats ce n'est ld qu'un effet naturel du contrat,
ce n'est point un effet essentiel, et les parties peuvent y ddroger en ddclarent
formellement que la propridtd ne sera transfdrde d l'acheteur qu'aprns un
certain temps, ou d l'arrivde d'une condition, ou bien encore lorsque le vendeur, qui n'est pas propridtaireau moment du contrat, aura pu traiter avec
le vdritable propridtaire de l'objet alidnd, ou enfin lorsque l'acqudreur aura
payd son prix. . . . il n'y a rien d'immoral nt d'illiclte 4 diffdrer la translation de propridtd, et le principe de la libertd des conventions suffit pour permettre au parties cette ddrogation aux effets ordinaires de la vente."
See also 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 4, at 8, no 9; 5 Aubry
et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1907) 2, § 349 n. 1; 19 BaudryLacantinerie et Saignat, Trait6 Thdorique et Pratique de Droit Civil (1910)
8, no 11.
6. 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 4, at 9, no 4: "Faut-il conclure de I4 que
la translationde la proprldtd est de l'essence de la vente 7 Non, la loi ne le dit
pas, et cela ne rdsulte pas des principes. Les orateurs du Tribunat invoquent
le droit naturel, c'est-d-dlre la volontd de parties contractantes;or, les parties
ont le drolt de manifester une volontd contraire; rien ne les empdche de
consentir une vente romaine, comme nous le dirons en expliquant l'article
1599. A plus forte raison, les parties peuvent-elles stipuler que la propridtd
ne sera transfdrde que lorsque l'acheteur aura payd le prix; la vente aura
toufours pour objet de transfdrer la propridtd, mais la translation sera conditionnelle, de sorte que le vendeur restera propridtairetant que la condition
ne sera pas accomplie, c'est-d-dire tant que le prix ne sera pas payd."
See also 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 5, at 55, § 352, n. 1; 19
Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8, 141, nos 11, 141-143; Trib. de
Saint-Omer, 7 aofit 1891, Sirey 1893.2.199; Cass. Ch. req., 17 juill. 1895, Dalloz
1896.1.57.
A counterpart of the conditional sale, based on Article 2457 of the French
Civil Code, is recognized in French law. Note (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 122,
123. For a discussion of the conditional sale in the civil law, see Cruz, The
Validity of the Conditional Sale in Civil Law (1930) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 530.
The conditional sale should not be confused with a synallagmatic promise
of sale, that is, a contract containing two promises: a promise to buy and
a promise to sell. Such a contract is equivalent to an absolute sale in French
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In France, the vendor under such a contract has an absolute right
to recover the thing, even to the prejudice of bona fide purchasers
or of mortgage creditors of the first vendee.7
Although there was some authority to the contrary,8 it is now
well settled that a conditional sale of movable property (as it is
known to the common law) is not possible under the laws of this
state. In Louisiana, the vesting of title is the essence of a contract of sale and is an element which cannot be contracted
against by the parties. "Divided incidents of ownership" subsisting in the buyer and seller are not recognized. 10 Where all the
essential elements of a sale are present, the effects of an absolute
law. See 2 Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Positif Francais (2 ed. 1933) 561,

no 1069.

7. Dalloz, R4pertoire de Lgislation, de Doctrine et de Jurisprudence

(nouvelle ed. 1857), Vo Privileges et hypoth~ques, no 632.
8. In Baldwin v. Young, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 1469-1470, 17 So. 883, 884 (1895),
the court stated: "In this case there is no controversy on the issue of the
ownership of the heater. It belongs to the vendor under his conditional sale.
It is the case of the property of the third person . . . unless it is to be
maintained that our Code transforms the property of the vendor who has
We find no
never parted with the ownership into that of the purchaser ....
We think it beyond doubt
warrant in our Code for this view of the law ....
that the mortgage yields to the vendor's privilege on the movable sold and
attached to the mortgaged property. . . . It seems to us on the same principle the claim of the vendor, who remains the owner of the movable placed
in the mortgaged premises must be admitted against the mortgaged credi" One early case held that a conditional sale followed by delivery
tor ..
is a vente 4 rdmr6 (a sale with a power of redemption): Smoot v. Baldwin, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 528 (1823). Cf. Patterson v. Bonner, 19 La. 508 (1841).
Art. 2457, La. Civil Code of 1870 (which corresponds to Art. 1584, French
Civil Code) provides: "The sale may be made purely and simply, or under
a condition either suspensive or resolutive." Compare the language of Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana (1925) 472: "The sale may be
either absolutely or on a condition. The condition may be resolutory, entitling the person to rescind the contract in case certain conditions are not
complied with, or it may be suspensive." Is a conditional sale a contract
with a suspensive condition?
9. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46
So. 193 (1908); Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., Inc., 174 La. 658, 141
So. 368 (1932); Claude Neon Federal Co. v. Angell, 153, So. 581 (La. App.
1934); Thomas v. Philip Werlein, 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935). See also,
Hyatt, Status of Sales with Reservation of Title under Louisiana Law (1930)
11 Loyola L. J. 49-55.
An agreement to sell which is conditioned on the payment of a certain
sum at a specified date and in which the prospective purchaser promises,
in case of his failure to pay, to return the property delivered to him, is an
option to purchase: Smith & Standifer v. Ivey Bros., 119 La. 357, 44 So. 126
(1907). An option to purchase is essentially different from an option to return a purchase. In one case the title does not pass until the option is determined, in the other the property passes at once, subject to the right to
rescind and return: Win. Franz & Co. v. Fink & Moss, 6 Orleans App. 239
(1909).
10. California Fruit Exchange v. Meyer, Inc., 8 La. App. 198 (1927). Conditonal sales of railway equipment and tank cars are permitted by special
statutes. La. Act 111 of 1894 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8056-8059]; La. Act 119
of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8060-8061].

1940]

COMMENTS

sale follow whether the parties intended them or not.11 If a conditional sale contract is entered into, the clause reserving title to
the vendor is disregarded, and the effect of the transaction is that12
the title passes to the buyer immediately by operation of law.
Therefore, the purchaser of movables under a contract of conditional sale can give a clear title to third parties even though
the price remains unpaid.1 3
Attempts by stipulation to avoid the effect of the prohibition
against the conditional sale have been consistently nullified by
the courts. For instance, an agreement that the vendor should
have the privilege of repossessing the object if the vendee should
fail to pay the price and that in the event of such repossession
all payments should be retained by the vendor as rent and
compensationi for deterioration, was held to be in effect a prohibited stipulation that the ownership of the thing should remain
in the vendor until the payment of the purchase price.14
Many contracts which provide for a reservation of title are
in the form of a lease, 5 or contain language more appropriate to
a lease than to a conditional sale. 6 But, the form of the instrument is of little import in determining the nature of the contract; 17 nor does the name which the parties give the transaction
fix its character. 8 The law goes behind the descriptive terms used
and looks to the substance of the transaction. 9 A so-called con11. Thomas v. Philip Werlein, 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935). Cf. State v.
Whited & Wheless, 104 La. 125, 28 So. 922 (1900). The essential elements of
a sale are set forth in Art. 2439, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So. 411 (1928). However, the thing is
subject to a vendor's lien securing the price: Standard Chevrolet Co. v. Federal Hardware & Implement Mutuals, 178 So. 642 (La. App. 1937).
In Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46
So. 193 (1908), the vendor lost his security when the vendee resold the property to a third person; the reservation of title was disregarded and the vendor's lien was lost upon resale. This case has been criticized because it limits
contractual freedom. It is argued that the moment at which title should pass
is a purely "accidental" element of the sale which the parties should be free
to determine according to their convenience. Cruz, supra note 6, at 571-574.
13. U. S. Slicing Machine Co. v. Joseph, 7 La. App. 451 (1928).
14. Thomas v. Philip Werlein, 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935). Such a stipulation is deemed not written, If the vendor relies thereon and forcibly seizes
the property, he is liable in damages.
15. Movable as well as immovable property may be leased. Arts. 2676,
2678, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441 (1928); U. S. Slicing Machine
Co. v. Joseph, 7 La. App. 451 (1928); Philip Werlein v. Sallis, 8 La. App. 61
(1928); General Talking Pictures Corporation v. Pine Tree Amusement Co.,
Inc., 180 La. 529, 156 So. 812 (1934).
17. Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 163 La. 1057, 1113
So. 454 (1927).
18. See Bohanon v. Stewart, 4 La. App. 150, 153 (1926).
19. Cf. Long v. Sun Co., 132 La. 601, 61 So. 684 (1913) (the designation of
a contract as a "sale" does not make it such where it is apparent that the
parties were making a "lease.")
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tract of lease by which the "lessee" binds himself at once and
irrevocably for a rental equal to the full value of the thing and
is to become owner thereof when the "rent" is paid in full (and
without the payment of any further consideration) is nothing
other than a conditional sale; and the effect is to vest title in the
"lessee" as purchaser from the very inception of the contract. 0
A transferor cannot hold the transferee liable for the price of
the thing and at the same time retain the ownership of the thing
in himself as security.2 1 Where the parties intended a transfer of
ownership for a fixed sum of money, "denominated by them as
rental or hire, the transaction will be deemed a sale and not a
lease.'

2

Stipulations restricting the right of the vendee to use,

enjoy, or dispose of the thing should not be considered as converting the contract into one of lease but should be ignored and
2
considered as not written.

The question of whether a contract is a conditional sale or
a lease depends upon the circumstances attending the transaction.
Factors tending to indicate that a so-called "lease" is in reality
a sale are: that the "lessee" is given practically all the rights of
an owner;24 that the "rentals" are large, 25 represent the full value
of the thing, 26 and are in fact intended as a purchase price; 27 that
it is reasonable to assume the thing will be consumed or will have
20. Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441 (1928).
21. Philip Werlein v. Sallis, 8 La. App. 61 (1928).
22. Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 163 La. 1057, 1062,
113 So. 454, 456 (1927). In Bohanon v. Stewart, 4 La. App. 150, 153 (1926), the
court said: "It is not the name which the parties give to the contract which
fixes its character. Their common intention must control rather than the
literal sense of the terms.... So, also, the construction put upon it by both
or by one with the assent of the other." Furthermore, neither party is
estopped from contending that the contract is a sale by the fact the transaction is designated a lease: Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co.,
supra.
23. Philip Werlein v. Sallis, 8 La. App. 61 (1928). See the test set forth
In Note (1922) 17 A.L.R. 1421, 1435-1436 for distinguishing conditional sales
from leases: "Contracts are frequently made which involve elements both of
conditional sale and of lease, and it is not always clear whether such contracts are to be construed to be conditional sales or leases. The test most
frequently applied in determining the character of a contract, in this regard,
is as to whether or not the so-called lessee is obligated to accept and pay
for the property at some future time. If this is the effect of the contract, it
will be construed to be one of conditional sale, and not one of lease, notwithstanding the use of terms therein commonly used in leases and not ordinarily used in sales contracts."
24. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Pine Tree Amusement Co.,
180 La. 529, 533, 156 So. 812, 813 (1934).
25. See Bohanon v. Stewart, 4 La. App. 150, 153 (1926).
26. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Pine Tree Amusement Co., 180
La. 529, 533, 156 So. 812, 813 (1934).
27. See Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 163 La. 1057, 1062,
113 So. 454, 455 (1927).
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served its usefulness during the period of the "lease"; 28 that the
contract contains a clause by virtue of which, on default in payment of an installment, the entire price of the contract becomes
29

due.

Where the parties resort to a lease agreement, with a provision for the payment of an additional sum by the lessee in
order to obtain title, the courts subject the transaction to an
equally close scrutiny. Such a contract "is simply a lease with
an option to purchase, and is not a sale." 30 But, even in this type
of agreement, the additional payment must be a substantial sum;
where it is a merely nominal amount the contract is deemed to
be a sale translative of ownership from its very inceptionA1
Although an agreement by which title is retained in the
vendor is unknown to the laws of this state, it is well established
that, where a conditional sale is contracted in some other state
and the article is later brought here, the rights of the parties2
under the contract will be recognized through rules of comity3

Thus, the rights of the original vendor under a conditional sale
contracted in a foreign jurisdiction are superior to those of a
Louisiana citizen who purchases the thing in good faith and for
a valuable consideration after it is brought into this state.3 3 However, if there is any evidence of an attempt to circumvent Louisiana law, the transaction will not be upheld. 4 If the vendor
consents to the buyer's transfer of the property into Louisiana,
28. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Pine Tree Amusement Co., 180
La. 529, 533, 156 So. 812, 814 (1934).
29. See Bohanon v. Stewart, 4 La. App. 150, 153 (1926).
30. See Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 404-405, 117 So. 441, 442 (1928). Cf.
Doullut v. Rush, 142 La. 443, 77 So. 110 (1917).
31. Bohanon v, Stewart, 4 La. App. 150 (1926) ("lease" of oil burner for
16% months for $495, with the privilege of purchasing at the end of the lease
for $1); Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 163 La. 1057, 113 So.
454 (1927) ("lease" of filling machine for one year for $4,500, with option to
purchase for $1); Graham Glass Co. v. Nu Grape Bottling Co., 164 La. 1103,
115 So. 285 (1928) ("lease" of machine for cash, plus 18 rental payments,
with option then to purchase for $1). Cf. General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Pine Tree Amusement Co., 180 La. 529, 156 So. 812 (1934).
32. Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 138 (1922);
Baldwin Piano Co. v. Thompson, 8 La. App. 212 (1928); Securities Sales Co.
v. Blackwell, 9 La. App. 651, 120 So. 250 (1928), affirmed 167 La. 667, 120 So.
45 (1929); Finance Sec. Co. v. Conway, 176 La. 456, 146 So. 22 (1933). Cf. Art.
10, La. Civil Code of 1870.
33. Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 138 (1922);
Baldwin Piano Co. v. Thompson, 8 La. App. 212 (1928).
The fact that the vendor, after a conditional sale in a foreign jurisdiction, gave the vendee the possession of the thing, does not operate as an
estoppel against him. For such an estoppel to apply, the owner must have
given not only possession but also some other indicium of ownership. Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, supra. Cf. Art. 2452, La. Civil Code of 1870.
34. American Slicing Mach. Co. v. Rothschild & Lyons, 12 La. App. 287,
125 So. 499 (1930).
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35
this act is deemed a sufficient attempt to evade Louisiana law.
An even clearer case is made out where at the time of the contract it is intended that the property be used in this state 5 The
result is the same whether the property is delivered to the vendee
in this state or in the foreign jurisdiction.
With regard to immovable property, "bond for deed" agreements" are enforceable. 8 Such agreements reach very nearly the
same result as is effected by conditional sales. For instance, the
contract enforced in Pruyn v. Gay 40 provided for: (1) immediate

35. American Slicing Mach. Co. v. Rothschild & Lyons, 12 La. App. 287,
125 So. 499 (1930). The court in this case distinguished those cases in which
the rights of the conditional vendors under contracts executed in other states
were upheld: "In none of these cases, though, does it appear that the property conditionally sold was removed to Louisiana with the consent of the
seller. Nor does any of them go farther than to hold that the buyer cannot
deprive the unpaid seller of his property by unauthorized removal of it to
this state. And though all of them do uphold the right of the unpaid seller
to invoke the aid of the courts of this state to repossess himself of his
property unauthorizedly brought into Louisiana, yet none of them involved
his right to invoke such aid where, as here, he had himself shipped the property into Louisiana and the reservation of the title thereto in himself manifestly was an effort to avoid the effect of the very laws whose protection
he invoked." (12 La. App. at 292-293, 125 So. at 502).
In Note (1933) 87 A.L.R. 1308, 1311, it is stated: ". . . the rules of comity
are sometimes not permitted to override the settled public policy of the state
to which the property is subsequently removed, as evidenced by the statute
of that state; and there are cases in which, notwithstanding the fact that
the removal was without the knowledge and consent of the vendor, or that
no removal was contemplated under the contract, the reserved title of the
conditional vendor has been subordinated to the rights of the subsequent
bona fide purchasers from, or creditors of, the vendee in the state to which
the property was removed, although such title would have been good against
purchasers or creditors in the state where the contract was made."
36. Finance Security Co., Inc. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657 (La. App. 1939), noted
in (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 122. Cf. Clyde Iron Works v. Frericks, 203 Fed.
637 (1913).
A contract made in Georgia for the conditional sale of machinery to be
delivered in Louisiana may, while the machinery is in transit, be revoked by
agreement of the parties; and a sale may be made in Louisiana conferring a
vendor's privilege on the machinery. Pratt Engineering & Machine Co. v.
Cecelia Sugar Co., 135 La. 179, 65 So. 100 (1914).
37. See Finance Security Co., Inc. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657, 660 (La. App.
1939), noted in (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 122.
38. A "bond for deed" is "a contract to sell real property, in which the
purchase-price is to be paid to the vendor in installment payments by the
purchaser, for his convenience, and in which the vendor after final payment
of the agreed price, covenants and agrees to deliver to the purchaser a deed
and title to the property purchased." La. Act. 169 of 1934, § 7 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 5021.15].
39. Pruyn v. Gay, 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925). For legislative regulation
of the "bond for deed," see La. Act 169 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5021.95021.16].
Where an insurance policy contains a clause stipulating that the policy
shall be void if there is a change in the interest of the insured, a mere
promise of sale does not operate as a forfeiture. Trichel v. Home Ins. Co.,
155 La. 459, 99 So. 403 (1924).
The sale of encumbered property by a "bond for deed" contract is unlawful. La. Act 169 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5021.9).
40. 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925).
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possession by the vendee; (2) monthly payments on the purchase
price; (3) payment of taxes and insurance by the vendee; (4)
conveyance of a deed after full payment, provided, that in case of
default, the vendor might keep all prior payments as liquidated
damages and fair rental. 41 Under this type of contract the vendor
has an option as to two courses of action. He may demand specific
performance of the contract; 41 or, he may rescind the contract
and hold prior payments forfeited as rentals.
In order to uphold "bond for deed" agreements, the courts
have recognized a distinction between movable and immovable
property.43 As to movable property,
"the sale is complete between the parties by their mere consent, and as to the whole world by delivery. Hence where the
thing sold has been delivered and there remains only to pay
the price, it is quite immaterial what name the parties give
to such price .... 44
On the other hand, with regard to real estate, neither consent,
delivery, nor payment of the price is sufficient to transfer the
45
ownership; there must be a deed translative of the title.
The doctrine of the Pruyn case is limited and qualified by
Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel,5 where the court, although recognizing "bond for deed" agreements, did not allow the vendor to
retain payments made by the vendee because they bore no
reasonable relation to the fair rental value of the property. While
Article 211747 does recognize that a penal clause in a contract is
valid, such penalty is by way of compensation for damages resulting from the inexecution of the principal obligation. 8 Where
41. In case of the vendee's failure to make payments, the vendor is entitled to have the "promise of sale" erased from the records.
42. By virtue of acceleration clauses he can usually sue for the full

balance.
43. Cf. Art. 2456, La. Civil Code of 1870, which does not make a distinction between movables and immovables.
44. Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 155 La. 459, 462, 99 So. 403, 404 (1924).
45. Ibid. Even though the "bond for deed" agreement does not pass title,

it may be recorded, thereby protecting the vendee as regards subsequent
purchasers. A "promise of sale" of real estate amounts to a sale only in the
sense that it entitles either party to enforce specific performance; it does

not transfer ownership, nor does it put the thing at the risk of the promisee.

Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., supra. In a contract for the future sale of immovables, the risk of loss is on the seller since title does not pass. Page v.
Loeffler, 146 La. 890, 84 So. 194, 22 A.L.R. 563 (1920). "Bond for deed" contracts are not void as containing the potestative condition. Middleton v.
Natal, 9 La. App. 596 (1928).
46. 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926). Accord: Dambly v. Burrell, 147 So.
711 (La. App. 1933); Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936); Chauvin v. Theriot, 180 So. 847 (La. App. 1938).
47. La. Civil Code of 1870.
48. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926).
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the vendor under a "bond for deed" contract exercises his right
not to sell as a result of default in payments, he
can retain only
49
a fair rental and must account for the balance.
Under Louisiana law the security advantages of the conditional sale are not necessary to protect the interests of the vendor. One security device he has is a privilege on the property
sold to the extent of the unpaid purchase price.50 However, this
privilege can be exercised only so long as the thing remains in
the possession of the vendee. 51 Another protection to the vendor
is the resolutory condition (implied in every contract of sale),
by virtue of which he may dissolve the contract for the nonpayment of the purchase price.5 2 If the property is immovable, even
though it has passed into the hands of third parties, the vendor
may dissolve the sale and retake the property. 5 As to movables
the right of resolution may be exercised only so long as the
property remains in the possession of the original vendee,61 but
if the vendor desires greater security, he may protect himself by
a chattel mortgage, 55 which after recordation is good against third
parties. Therefore, under Louisiana law, the vendor has ample
security without the troublesome conditional sale of other jurisdictions.
F. HODGE O'NEAL
49. Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936). La. Act 169 of 1934,
1 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5021.10] provides that payments under a "bond for

deed" agreement must be made in escrow. This protects the vendee to a
certain extent, but he still forfeits prior payments if he defaults.
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